

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Henry A. Kissinger
Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Notetaker)

DATE & TIME:

August 27, 1973; 8:15 a.m.

PLACE:

State, OSD, JCS reviews
completed

The Western White House

Dr. Kissinger: I had a good session with your associates, Pickering and Eliot yesterday.

Secretary Rush: So I understand. Before I heard that you were coming on as Secretary, I'd begun to try to reorganize the Department. I was not happy, for example, with relations between the Planning and Coordination Staff and the Secretary. There were second-rate people in there and they were failing in their coordination role. I wanted a tough man to head it; a man who would reorient the operation. I selected Jim Sutterlin. He's a very good man. I picked both Tom Pickering and Jim Sutterlin.

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, I wasn't sure that I was going to take this job. Before the Watergate mess, I had planned to leave. I planned to leave by the end of the year. Now this switch could mean that before it's over I'll lose some power. You know only Schlesinger and Moorer haven't bothered to call up and congratulate me. State's their natural enemy in running the interdepartmental process.

Secretary Rush: It will be far better for government if things work out right. Your switch should make it possible.

Dr. Kissinger: The reason I took the job was to try to institutionalize what we've been doing. I wanted to bring along the professionals, make the Department exciting, help overcome our domestic problems by

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moving on the foreign side. Thus the transition must be a unifying experience. It must be as unifying as possible; that depends to some degree on Rogers. I thought his remarks on the wiretapping were unnecessary. You know it will hurt the President if the real truth comes out.

Secretary Rush: The Sullivan reply was best. He said he had assumed all along that he was tapped.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the Department's comments under restraint?

Secretary Rush: I can't keep Bill under restraint; the others, yes.

Dr. Kissinger: OK, first off, I want to give a dinner for Rogers. I want you, the widows of former Secretaries of State, Senior FSO's. It's in our interest to make this transition as non-contentious as possible. By the way, I'm sorry about the Alsop column. I haven't talked to him; I don't know who has.

Any help you can give me will be greatly appreciated. I wanted you to know how I intend to approach the process. I have ideas, but I want yours. I want the payoff to be that we leave the Department in the best shape it's ever been in. When I came here the staff was bitching for about the first six months, but now they're pretty satisfied.

Secretary Rush: Let me give you a little background. You know in the State Department, in the Foreign Service, reassignment is a matter of policy; therefore there should be no problem in moving people about.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right, the Foreign Service is a service. I don't intend to bargain about what they are going to be doing; they'll take it whether they like it or not. The attitude ought to be that they will be measured by the contribution they can make.

Secretary Rush: That's true. You know in the Foreign Service the concept of what is important is that you get to be an Ambassador; that's the ultimate ambition.

Dr. Kissinger: I have little sympathy for those who cry about their career. I always think that you should pick somebody who's slightly underqualified for the job. If he's good, it stretches him. Winston Lord, for example, was a child when he came to work for me. But now he's become one of my closest associates and a distinguished public servant.

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I don't believe we should discuss the details of personnel until after my confirmation, but we can talk in general, particularly about senior people. I'm calling some back, you know, but that's largely for eyewash. Incidentally, you and I will be partners, everything I know you will know. Just as when Haig worked for me, he knew everything I knew; now Scowcroft knows everything. So will you. We will then have to decide on who else ought to know. One leak and I'm moving things back to the White House. You and I and the Executive Secretary should know everything. We'll decide who else should know.

Secretary Rush: I see no basic problem with that.

Dr. Kissinger: The FSO's on my staff, though not the cream of the crop, haven't leaked. I've worked with a number of FSO's quite directly like Sullivan and Porter; they haven't leaked.

Secretary Rush: Henry, to some degree it's in the nature of things. Reporters are trained to put pieces together.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to shut down the practice of having reporters wander the halls. We've got to get a situation in which the FSO's don't want to show off so much.

Secretary Rush: Part of it is frustration; that's part of the cause of the leaks.

Dr. Kissinger: Has the Bray thing multiplied?

Secretary Rush: I'll talk to Bray today. I don't think there's any serious problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want him to continue in his present job. I don't think he's good for that job, but he does have good qualities. I want to put the best people in the right job; I may be a pain in the neck to work for, but I'm not vindictive.

Secretary Rush: If we work properly together we can build up a real head of steam in the Department. I'll be frank with you about your plans and activities.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what I want. You and I will meet every day. I will rely upon you to manage the Department once you and I know what I want. You must tell me when you think I'm wrong.

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Secretary Rush: Each of us must know what the other is doing. Each of us must know what the other is thinking.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no secrets from you. The FSO's will want me to dominate the city. I must lean over backward not to do that. You should manage the IG papers. I'll have the last crack at them anyway. Once in a while State must lose.

Secretary Rush: There are certain essentials. First, your relationship with the President.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because of that I expect to spend part of each day at the White House.

Secretary Rush: Yes, now the second point is that you must be Secretary of State and you must trust the Department. Third, you must be impartial in the interdepartmental forum. State has felt downtrodden in the past. It will try to reassert itself. Now is when we must be modest. You shouldn't be a gladiator for the State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: Take the Verification Panel. We're going to have a murderous problem on SALT. Dobrynin and I will finally have to work out the negotiation, but I can't do it as Secretary of State. The Chiefs will be murderous. We may need to develop an adversary position.

Secretary Rush: Yes, we don't want to get State ideologically committed to any particular course.

Dr. Kissinger: I'll want to shape positions more than Bill did.

Secretary Rush: That's right. We've got to let people be heard.

Dr. Kissinger: Some issues I'll turn over to you completely. Others like SALT and MBFR I'll take an active interest in, but I'll always want your active participation and advice. We must make Brent a partner as well. We can use the NSC system very well for that.

Secretary Rush: I have trouble seeing you preside at these interdepartmental meetings. There's a problem of your time and there's a problem of the impact on other departments. Over time you should shift some

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of the committees to the Deputy Secretaries and let other committees slip to Assistant Secretaries, with Brent chairing. You know that the real purpose of the committees was to move power to the President. The Deputies were spokesmen for the Secretaries. Today you don't need that.

Dr. Kissinger: If we move these committees to committees of the Secretaries, we'll have an NSC without the President.

Secretary Rush: No, that's not true. Shultz has an East-West Trade Committee. I attended a meeting with Dent and Butz. It was a useful meeting. It will help save you time but it doesn't replace the need for the President.

Dr. Kissinger: As an Assistant to the President, I can take issues to the President.

Secretary Rush: Yes, there's no problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I really ought to have breakfast on Mondays with Colby, Schlesinger and Moorer.

Secretary Rush: It's not really tolerable for you to want to continue to chair these meetings. Is it fair to the Secretary of State, particularly in terms of your time? It's certainly not fair to the Defense Department.

Mr. Eagleburger: Yes, but if you have meetings with Secretaries you may have a head-to-head confrontation. Then you'll have to go to the President to get it resolved.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, but if the President backs me a few times it'll be good. If I maintain my position with the President there shouldn't be any trouble.

Secretary Rush: But if I'm there at these meetings, State will have no input. I'm not going to argue with the Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we could change you and put me in your spot and we could have Schlesinger for Clements.

Secretary Rush: Yes, and you can use the Under Secretaries Committee more as a study committee. Brent could chair the Assistant Secretaries

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meetings where they thrash out things. By and large you should have fewer meetings. Have more done at a lower level.

Dr. Kissinger: You're right. I want to look at the Policy Planning Operation. I'm particularly concerned that it's overstaffed.

Secretary Rush: I've talked to Jim Sutterlin about that. I've told him without getting any blood flowing we must get a smaller staff, get the academics in. We should move the PARA thing out entirely. Get things down to one-third or one-half of what they are today.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine. But hold up on restructuring until I get there.

Secretary Rush: I'd like to get the planning and coordination people moving.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, hold up until I get there.

Secretary Rush: OK. I don't want you to be the focal point for discontent as we remove people, however. I've asked Jim Sutherland and Tom Pickering to look at the restructuring plans for the planning council and for SS.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have vanities over prerogatives. I will, however, have views on substance.

Secretary Rush: I know you will, Henry. We won't have any problems. The worst thing that could happen would be for you to leave government.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I was thinking about it. The President didn't even raise this move with me until about one week before it happened.

Secretary Rush: In all honesty, it's better than your staying here and my becoming Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger: Protocol -- what do we do about that? It ought to be changed. Smoak isn't much good.

Secretary Rush: Yes, he has to be changed. It's a mess now.

Dr. Kissinger: I want you to go to China. Maybe not this year, but next year. You should see how they handle protocol. You are enveloped

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in graciousness. But everything has a purpose. For instance, when we were on the plane the protocol girl mentioned to me that Mrs. Bhutto was in Peking. I told the others on the plane that that meant that the Chinese wanted me to see her. They said no. Then the Chinese mentioned it to me several other times. When I finally offered to see Mrs. Bhutto they were pleased as punch.

Secretary Rush: Our Protocol department is the worst thing in Washington.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would be good? Carter Burton. He has an attractive wife. That might be a possibility.

Have you given me a list of ambassadors? By the end of the year we will have them filled. By the first of November every embassy not now filled will be. By January 1, every ambassador who needs to be changed will be. If you could go through that list I would appreciate it. You know them better than I.

By the way, I see that you are going to Africa in October. That may not be possible because I probably will be in China then.

Secretary Rush: OK, but let me know as soon as possible, please. I plan to travel to each area to see the ambassadors there.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to go to two or three ambassadorial meetings out of the country myself. When I go to China I plan to see the Asian ambassadors in Japan. I'll see the European ambassadors before the NATO meeting. There will be a Pilgrims meeting in October. Maybe I could go then. But I have no occasion to see the Africans. You should do that. My most probable dates for the China trip are between the 20th and the 30th of October.

Secretary Rush: I'll shift a month. Maybe from the 5th to the 19th. Also, Henry, you don't realize the many unproductive demands upon your time. You have to go to NATO, to SEATO. Frankly, SEATO will die without your presence. And CENTO.

Dr. Kissinger: I'd like to do CENTO. To keep it going. I notice that there is a SEATO meeting in New York on the 28th.

Secretary Rush: You ought to go to that. You also ought to spend some time at the UN. I'm always charged these days by others with ignoring the UN.

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Dr. Kissinger: I'd prefer to give the opening speech, stay two or three days, and then leave it to you the rest of the time.

Secretary Rush: The world is watching to see if you will be interested in the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: I'll have a lunch for the Arabs, for the Africans, and for the Latin Americans. I'll want to see as many European foreign ministers as possible. I'll also want to see Gromyko. Then I'll want to have a dinner for all senior delegations. I want to have more fun than the normal entertainment given by the State Department. Maybe I can get some of my entertainment friends to participate. I'll give a little speech and we'll have some entertainment. I'll want to give a dinner here for the diplomatic corps, with some entertainment; and I'll also want to give a dinner for the State press corps.

Secretary Rush: I think you ought to give a dinner. Particularly because you won't see so much of them. Henry, it will be hazardous for you to see only the major ambassadors all the time and less of the ambassadors from the smaller countries. You ought to let the subject matter determine who sees ambassadors.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the legal adviser? Who picked him? I see that we got a 67 year old lawyer from New York. I wanted a well-known top lawyer. I suppose it would hurt us in the legal community to pull him out now, though. Perhaps we can replace him later. Maybe we could make him an ambassador in a year or so.

Secretary Rush: Bill Casey and I picked him. He is not a Rogers man. Rogers told us to get him somebody and get him in. He's already been in the Department for more than six weeks waiting to be confirmed. He's left his firm. Unless you send his name up, it would look very odd.

Dr. Kissinger: OK, let's wait until I get over there.

Secretary Rush: What about a Marshall Green successor? We've nominated Hummel and Sneider. I think Sneider is the better of the two, but there is a feeling around that you had a run-in with him.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I want to hold up on that until I get there.

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Secretary Rush: What do you think of Ingersoll?

Dr. Kissinger: That's one reason I'm waiting. I like him. You and he are the best ambassadorial appointments we ever made.

Secretary Rush: I talked him into taking the job.

Dr. Kissinger: I have nothing against Sneider. He's tough and he's disloyal. Every time I saw him in Japan he tore his Ambassador down to me. What about INR? I cannot understand why we need 400 people in Intelligence. What we need is a small tight outfit that flags things for the Secretary. It can't match CIA. It should be pared down to research and monitoring the efforts of the intelligence community. I also want to have a systems analysis capability.

Secretary Rush: I agree. I've seen the thing evolve. Cline is pushing now for an even greater machine. He should be working with the Assistant Secretaries. My view now is that we should cut the thing back to a small tight-knit group. Also, you have a mass of assistants to the Secretary that supposedly report to you. Those should be cut way back; they should report to someone else. If we get our legislation we can put a lot of them into the Science Assistant Secretary's slot. We could make them sub-bureau chiefs.

Henry, it is important that we get Hall out of the Director General's job. He ought to retire, but there would be trouble because the foreign service is watching. He ought to get a good embassy for a year and then retire. Dean Brown would be my choice for that job.

Dr. Kissinger: I've asked him to come back. I'm asking a number of people back.

Secretary Rush: Yes, you'd better ask Graham Martin back or you'll be getting some screams from him.

Dr. Kissinger: OK. Larry, call him back.

Secretary Rush: You must have a strong staff. But you must get rid of Lissy.

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Dr. Kissinger: I agree. But you should tell him that he'll get a good job.

Secretary Rush: I'll do that. You need very good people. Tom Pickering will be a very big help to you. He was my personal choice. You need FSOs around you. Thus, you should not bring in someone from the NSC. You can find FSOs.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems. One is loyalty. But that doesn't worry me. But I need someone who knows my style of work. I haven't got six months to educate people.

[Conversation interrupted by Gwertzman call.]

Dr. Kissinger: Gwertzman tells me that Rogers is beside himself about the Alsop article. Will you call him, please, and tell him I had nothing to do with the article. Tell him, too, of my talk with Gwertzman.

Secretary Rush: Yes, of course, I will. Henry, the first six weeks will be important. You will get loyalty from the Foreign Service.

Dr. Kissinger: They have got to understand that they work for me, not me for them.

Secretary Rush: You should come into the Department with State people.

Dr. Kissinger: The key spots will be filled by State people -- except for two or three who know me and work with me well.

I want to end the constant talk of prerogatives that goes on in the State Department. We must bring up the young people. I am not going over there in an adversary relationship as Dulles did. But painful things need to be done, and they should be done early. But for the good of the State Department.

Secretary Rush: The worst thing would be to do nothing. The next worst would be to go over in an adversary relationship.

Dr. Kissinger: They will have to learn to humor me for awhile. We all must be working for the country. I am going over there in a spirit of conciliation. That is why I said what I did on Thursday to the press. That is why I am trying to keep Bray. That is why I am working the way I am with Rogers. I intend to speak to the staff on the first day and have a press conference on the second.

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Secretary Rush: Let me come back to this thing, Henry. One important thing is that you should not be seen to be putting your total reliance on those you bring over from the NSC.

Dr. Kissinger: That is OK for about 90 percent. But I have got to have two or three people. I agree that the Director General is a key spot and must be used creatively. It should be filled by an FSO.

Secretary Rush: It would be a great morale booster to be seen to be acting in that direction. I am thinking of a strong right-hand man for you. He would deal with the Executive Secretary for you, with my staff, with Schlesinger, etc. You will be outside the Department and outside the country often. You will need someone to hold your staff together. You will need someone for liaison at the Secretarial level, that is, with the Assistant Secretaries, with me, etc. You have two hats, Henry, and you must be careful to have someone to coordinate those hats and your personal staff.

I think you ought to ask Larry to do that job for you. He's highly respected in the Department. He knows the Pentagon. He knows you. He knows the NSC staff. I think it would be very important for you to have him with you.

Dr. Kissinger: If Eagleburger goes with me, then we'll need someone to replace him on the NSC staff. I'd appreciate it if you'd get me a suggestion.

Secretary Rush: I want to leave with you the thought that you really must have a strong personal staff.

Dr. Kissinger: Can't the Executive Secretariat do it?

Secretary Rush: No. Not totally. They work for me, too. They work for the entire seventh floor.

Dr. Kissinger: You think then that I need someone for liaison with your staff, with the staff over here and with other departments, is that right?

Secretary Rush: If you do this which I think you should do, it is terribly important who you pick. I have one political man on my staff, Mike Samuels. He handles a lot of very sensitive stuff for me. I'm simply

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raising the flag for you, Henry. I don't want to see the Secretary of State supported by the NSC Staff. I want to see the Secretary of State supported by the State Department.

Dr. Kissinger: Ken, all key spots will be filled with Foreign Service officers. Maybe they'll be younger than they are now, but they'll be Foreign Service officers. I want the Foreign Service seen as an elite service. The best service in town. The preponderance of key slots in the State Department will go to the Foreign Service.

Secretary Rush: Frankly, if you do that, within three to six months there will be the highest morale in State that's been seen in our lifetime. Things will be personalized at State, they'll center around you. You have great prestige. It's in the bag, Henry.

Dr. Kissinger: Anything you can do over the next few days to get people to suspend judgment over there until I get there and show them how we can work would be appreciated.

Secretary Rush: That's fine. I'm going to have the senior people in the Department up for lunch. I'm going to tell them of our talk and tell them that we're going to get things moving.

Dr. Kissinger: Ken, I'll want to have breakfast with you next Monday.

Secretary Rush: Good. Also, I'm going to tell our Ambassadors about our conversation when I go to my meetings with them.

Dr. Kissinger: I'll want to give a dinner. I'll want to invite the Bohlens, the Loy Hendersons, and so forth. And then I'll want to have another dinner with the press.

Secretary Rush: Henry, we have to move on MBFR. We have to set up our group. First, has anyone talked to Stan Resor?

Dr. Kissinger: I'll check when I get back from San Clemente.

Secretary Rush: Then there's Jock Dean. I want to make him the Deputy Negotiator.

Dr. Kissinger: That's OK with me.

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Secretary Rush: Dean is a very good man. By the way, Fred Ikle wants ACDA to chair the Backstopping Committee.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all right with me. But who would do it?

Secretary Rush: He'll come up with the right man. We'll approve him. By the way, one of the things that may come up in your confirmation is the issue of State's appropriation.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I know. Wayne Hayes called me about that. He's rabid. He said we take his compromise or we get no bill. I told him I hadn't studied the issue. What's our objection to the base agreement requirement?

Secretary Rush: If we accept it then the President can't put in any bases without Congressional approval. If there's an earthquake in Managua the President can't even send our forces there without Congressional approval.

Dr. Kissinger: I have asked Tom Pickering to give me a report on the big issues that may come up in the confirmation, and on Congressional hobby horses. During the confirmation if the question of the budget comes up I'll say I oppose these legislative restrictions, but I'll be glad to look at them again. Then I'll go back to them later and turn them down again.

What's your instinct on how the hearings will go, Ken?

Secretary Rush: I saw Fulbright while playing golf a few weeks ago. He said he would be all for your appointment. But when they have you before the Committee they're not going to give up the opportunity to be in the headlines as they explore wiretapping, Cambodian bombing and so forth. You should be prepared for the worst. It may not happen, but they may push you on the intimate details of your relationship with the President. They'll be anxious to confirm you, but they're going to give you some trouble first.

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